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I. INTRODUCTION
THERE IS WIDESPREAD belief that the inflation and balance ofpayment problems facing the American economy are the result, in
large measure, of the machinations of the Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC).'. OPEC openly fixes prices, and price fixing is,
if engaged in by domestic American firms, a per se violation of section 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.2 Considering these facts together, it was no
doubt to be expected that someone would attempt to turn antitrust law
against OPEC by bringing suit under section 4 of the Clayton Act for
treble damages$ and under section 6 of that act for an injunction against
the price fixning.
4
The plaintiff that stepped forward was the International Association
of Machinists (IAM)-a union whose leadership has a reputation for lib-
* International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553
(C.D. Cal. 1979) [hereinafter cited as IAM v. OPEC].
** A.B., (1966) Yale University;, M.A., Philosophy (1968) Harvard University; Ph.D.,
Philosophy (1970) Harvard University; J.D. (1980) Duke University School of Law.
*** A condensed version of this comment is forthcoming in the INT'L AND CoMP. L.Q.
under the title The Suit Against OPEC: Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the United States.
OPEC had its origins in a 1960 meeting of representatives of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. The organization now also includes Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon,
Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. These nations, as well as
OPEC, were named as defendants in the suit.
OPEC's dramatic influence on the world oil economy began with a cut in production in
1972-73 and the embargo of the United States in 1973. "OPEC countries then quadrupled
their crude oil prices and accelerated the nationalization of oil operations." A. EZATI, WORLD
ENERGY MARKETS AND OPEC STABmrrY (i) (1978).
2 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that: "Every contract, combination in the form
of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations is hereby declared illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The section
continues, classifying the conduct as a felony and setting maximum penalties.
3 Section 4 provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is
found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
' Section 6 provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or associa-
tion shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States
having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the
antitrust laws . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
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eralism and which frequently exerts itself on issues that go well beyond
narrow trade union concerns. But the IAM stood far from alone with re-
spect to this suit. Appearances were made or briefs filed urging the grant-
ing of an injunction against OPEC or urging the court to retain jurisdic-
tion of the case by six amicus curiae, including two United States
Congresspersons.' A joint memorandum urging the court not to dismiss
the case was submitted by the attorneys general of seventeen states.
Despite its political popularity, however, and despite the fact that
domestic price fixing is a per se antitrust violation, the suit, in the end,
can only be regarded as quixotic. It was dismissed by District Court
Judge Hauk, and insofar as that dismissal was predicated on sovereign
immunity it was inevitable and correct. While the result of the case is, in
the final analysis, difficult to take exception to, a consideration of the
details of the opinion is revealing both for the light it sheds on the gen-
eral question of the amenability to suit of foreign governments under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 19766 (FSIA) and the specific ques-
tion of the amenability of foreign governments to suit under the antitrust
laws of the United States.
This paper will first sketch the major arguments of the opinion. It
will then criticize the opinion in the course of outlining a strategy to be
pursued if one were assigned the task of winning an antitrust suit against
OPEC. The final part of the paper will argue that, despite the technical
imperfections of the opinion, and despite the fact that the plaintiff's case,
properly prosecuted, would have had much to recommend it, the court
was nonetheless correct in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate
an antitrust suit against OPEC.
II. THE OPINION
Judge Hauk's opinion is divided into seven parts, including an intro-
duction and conclusion. The first, third, and fourth parts deal with anti-
trust doctrine, while the introduction, second, and fifth parts raise issues
of international law-primarily under FSIA. While conceptual economy
would be served by discussing all the antitrust issues together, followed
5 Amicus curiae included the Washington Legal Foundation, Public Advocates, Inc. of
San Francisco, American-G.I. Forum, Gulf and Western Industries, the Attorney General's
Office of the State of Connecticut, and Congressman Jim Leach with general agreement by
Congressman Tom Railsback.
0 90 Stat. 2891, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1441).
Its date of enactment was October 21, 1976. See generally, Grzybowski, The United States
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976, 1978 J. Bus. L. 111; von Mehren, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978).
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by a discussion of the international issues, this Comment will follow the
order of the opinion to avoid obscuring the overall structure of Judge
Hauk's argument.
Before getting into the substance of the opinion, it is important to
take note of the fact that none of the defendants made an appearance,
either special or general, at the hearing. This significantly affected the
procedural posture of the case, especially the possibility of default. Ap-
pearances were made on behalf of two amicus curiae' urging dismissal.
A. Introduction
The introduction was not limited to routine stage setting. It also dis-
missed OPEC itself from the suit-leaving as defendants the thirteen
member states of that organization. OPEC is not a sovereign, and so ju-
risdiction over OPEC could not be obtained under the long-arm section of
the FSIA.8 Neither could jurisdiction over OPEC be obtained under the
International Organizations Immunities Act9 since that act applies only to
organizations of which the United States is a member and other named
organizations. The court speculated that there was no means by which
process could validly be served on OPEC, but the issue was stipulated out
of the case by the plaintiff's admission "that OPEC could not be and had
not been legally served."10
B. Plaintiff as 'Indirect Purchaser'
The first contested issues dealt with by the opinion were antitrust
issues arising under the doctrine of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois., Illinois
Brick stands for the proposition that the plaintiff in a price fixing case
can recover damages only if it purchased directly from the price fixer.
The court found that "plaintiff was and is at the very best an indirect
purchaser, eight times removed from the defendants."' 2
The court refused to find that any of three possible exceptions to the
Illinois Brick doctrine applied. Plaintiff failed to prove (1) that defen-
dants controlled the United States oil companies from which plaintiff
bought gasoline, (2) that those oil companies conspired with the defen-
dants to fix prices, or (3) that 15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(2), permitting a pass
7 These were the Concerned Black Americans in Support of Africa and the Middle
East, and the U.S. Business Committee of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry.
* See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-04 (1976).
* 22 U.S.C. §§ 288-288i (1976).
10 IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 560.
- 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
"1 IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 561.
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through of crude oil price increases, brought the case within the "cost-
,.plus contract" exception to Illinois Brick.13
Since the action in Illinois Brick was for damages only, it left unde-
cided the question whether a direct purchase test is to be applied in a suit
for an injunction. This question has not been answered by subsequent
Supreme Court cases. Following the Third Circuit's recent decision in
Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc.,'14 Judge Hauk
held that the Illinois Brick doctrine should not be extended to bar an
injunction sought by an indirect purchaser. A suit for an injunction,
Judge Hauk argued, involves few of the problems that the Illinois Brick
Court referred to in denying a damage action to the indirect purchaser.
There would be no problem of apportioning recovery funds. Since one
injunction is as good as one hundred, there would be no multiplicity of
suits. And joinder and evidentiary problems would be less complicated.
In view of the desire of Congress for effective enforcement procedures
under the antitrust law, this Court does not believe that Congress in-
tended to totally exclude such a large class of potential plaintiffs from
the protection of the antitrust laws. Accordingly, this Court... concludes
that an indirect purchaser may sue for injunctive relief under the anti-
trust laws. 5
Thus plaintiff prevailed on one major unsettled point of antitrust
law. The injunctive suit's clearing of the Illinois Brick hurdle was, how-
ever, the last good news the plaintiff was to receive. All remaining issues
were decided in favor of the absent defendants.
C. Jurisdiction
The heart of the decision was the finding that courts of the United
States lack jurisdiction to adjudicate an antitrust case against members of
OPEC.. The court found a failure of both subject matter and personal
jurisdiction. Sovereign immunity is given explicit jurisdictional signifi-
cance under FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1330. Therefore the court may consider
the question of sovereign immunity sua sponte in ascertaining its own
jurisdiction.16
The FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 provides:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States
is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be
13 See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732 n.12 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
14 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
L5 IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 564.
"e See note 22 and text accompanying notes 40-41 infra for an examination of the justi-
fication of the court's considering sovereign immunity sua sponte.
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immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and the
States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
As the court noted, the exception which is possibly applicable to the
case is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) which excepts from immunity
action
... based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by
the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in con-
nection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon
'an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a
direct effect in the United States.
Since the last clause might apply if OPEC's price fixing was "in con-
nection with a commercial activity," the opinion turned to the issue of
whether the activities engaged in by the defendants were "commercial."
This was the key issue of the case.
Largely through the testimony of court appointed experts in oil eco-
nomics, the court established that the OPEC members' activities are non-
commercial for the purposes of the FSIA. Judge Hauk argued that the
commercial activity exception should be construed narrowly "guided by
the legislative intent of the FSIA, to keep our courts away from those
areas that touch very closely upon the sensitive nerves of foreign coun-
tries.1 17 Drawing on the testimony of the expert witnesses, the court con-
cluded that "the nature of the activity engaged in by each of these OPEC
member countries is the establishment by a sovereign state of the terms
and conditions for the removal of a prime natural resource-to wit, crude
oil-from its territory."1 8 The opinion did not draw the inference that
such activity amounted to a "sensitive nerve" but that is the implication,
and it is surely a natural one.
Judge Hauk argued further that international agreements establish-
ing the right of each nation to control its own resources entail that the
activities of the OPEC states are sovereign, rather than commercial.
Judge Hauk then considered domestic activities involving Califor-
nia's treatment of raisins"9 and state and federal treatment of oil,'2 and
found therein confirmation of his view that the control of resources, even
if connected with price fixing, is a sovereign activity.21
The court concluded that:
... the activity carried on by the defendant OPEC member nations is
not "commercial activity;" that, therefore, defendants are entitled to im-
17 IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 567.
IS Id.
" Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).20 See IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 568.
21 Id.
1980
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munity under 28 U.S.C. § 1604; and that, consequently, this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
And, since this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it also lacks
personal jurisdiction, as mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). 22
D. Foreign Sovereign Cannot Be Defendant in Antitrust Action
Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares that every "person" who en-
gages in the forbidden activity is guilty of a felony. Section 8 of the Sher-
man Act2 3 and section 1 of the Clayton Act24 define "person" to "include
corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of
either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of
any State, or the laws of any foreign country."
Judge Hauk argued that this statutory lanaguage excluded foreign
states from the "persons" who could be liable under the antitrust laws.
He relied upon Parker v. Brown,2 5 the well known 1943 case in which the
Supreme Court held that domestic states could not be antitrust defen-
dants. In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Co. 26 the Second Circuit expressed, in dic-
tum, that "Libya cannot be guilty of a Sherman Act violation . . . be-
cause it is not a person or a corporation within the terms of the Act but a
sovereign state."2 7
Finally Judge Hauk declared himself to be bound by a stare decisis
precedent by language in an opinion of a federal district court in Dela-
ware: "The Sherman Act refers only to persons not to states or nations."2 8
22 IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 569. However, note that 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) is not the
only grant of subject matter jurisdiction that might be relied upon in a suit against a foreign
state. Jurisdiction is arguably granted under § 1331 (general federal question jurisdiction) or
under such specific jurisdictional statutes as 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976) (antitrust jurisdiction).
If FSIA § 1604 is to be read as withdrawing subject matter jurisdiction, then Judge
Hauk's analysis is essentially correct. But traditionally sovereign immunity was seen as in-
volving relinquishment of jurisdiction-parallel to the doctrine of abstention. There was
thought to be no absence of judicial power as understood under the concept of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. See Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). There is no indication
in the legislative history that the FSIA was intended to alter sovereign immunity in this
respect. It remains true that sovereign immunity, unlike a defect in subject matter jurisdic-
tion, can be waived by the defendant. Moreover, the House Report states that sovereign
immunity is an affirmative defense. See notes 40-41 infra and accompanying text.
A better justification for the right and duty of the court to raise sovereign immunity
sua sponte is found in the anti-default clause of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1976). See
text accompanying notes 40-41 infra.
23 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976).
24 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
25 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
2- 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
7 Id. at 78, n.14.
28 Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maricaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 n.18
(D. Del. 1970).
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The court was unmoved by the fact that the 1978 decision of the
Supreme Court in Pfizer Inc. v. India29 held that foreign sovereigns do
count as "persons" for the antitrust laws when the question is who may
be a plaintiff. In distinguishing Pfizer Judge Hauk noted that the foreign
policy considerations involved in giving a foreign state status as plaintiff
are very different from those involved when the foreign state is a
defendant. °
Thus Judge Hauk found, in addition to sovereign immunity under
the FSIA, a second independent ground for dismissing the case against
the OPEC members. As foreign states they cannot be antitrust defen-
dants under the terms and policies of the antitrust laws.
E. No Proximate Cause, No Injunctive Relief
The court found yet a third alternative ground for dismissing the
suit. Plaintiff had failed to prove a direct causal connection between
OPEC's activities and the rise in gasoline prices at the American gas
pump. Therefore no injunction could issue, under traditional equitable
doctrine.
Judge Hauk blamed the rise in gasoline prices largely on United
States government regulation and concluded that ".... the rise in OPEC
crude oil prices was not a substantial factor in the rise of domestic gaso-
line prices. '3
0
F. No Default Judgment and No Waiver
The FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) provides that:
No judgment by default shall be entered by a Court of the United States
or of a State against a foreign state .. unless the claimant establishes
his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the Court.
Judge Hauk interpreted this statute to mean that the court must hold a
full hearing even if the foreign state fails to make an appearance after
being properly served and that all the defences discussed above may be
entertained at that hearing. Since the defenses were held to be valid, no
default judgment could issue.
III. THE CASE FOR RELIEF
A. Against OPEC
In the apparent absence of an applicable long-arm statute, it will not
29 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
30 IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 574.
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be possible to obtain personal jurisdiction over OPEC as an organization
unless it is "present" in the United States. Perhaps some such presence
can be found, but it is not at all obvious that OPEC's contacts with this
country are sufficiently direct to constitute presence. Therefore the court
was probably correct in dismissing OPEC from the case on this ground.
It is worth noting, however, that if personal jurisdiction could be ob-
tained over OPEC, there would be fewer remaining obstacles to relief
than there are with respect to the member states. Since OPEC is not a
state, it can claim no immunity under the FSIA. Moreover, it is an "asso-
ciation," and, arguably, one created under the laws of foreign states.
Therefore it would not be automatically disqualified as an antitrust de-
fendant. There would remain, of course, the Illinois Brick problem with
respect to damages and the proximate cause issue with respect to injunc-
tive relief.
B. The Antitrust Issues
Since the chief concern of this paper is the issue of sovereign immu-
nity, the antitrust issues will not be considered in detail; but a litigation
strategy, to have any hope of success against the OPEC countries, would
have to give considerable attention to the antitrust issues. There would,
in fact, be a significant chance for a plaintiff to prevail on the key anti-
trust issues in a properly conducted suit.
It will be useful to divide the antitrust issues into two divisions-the
issues that should be won on the facts and the issues that should be won
on the law. Facts are crucial to recovery of damages since it must be
shown that one of the exceptions to the Illinois Brick rule obtains. Most
plausible is the possibility of a conspiracy between OPEC and the oil
companies. Such a conspiracy, in effect, brings the plaintiffs into the posi-
tion of direct purchasers. One can surmise that in the contracts and com-
munications between the oil companies and the OPEC members, includ-
ing their proprietary companies, there could be found some evidence
tending to support a conspiracy. A conspiracy might also be inferred from
careful analysis of price movements within the world oil market. The
same or closely related facts would be useful to show that OPEC's price
fixing has a proximate effect on the price at the American gas pump.
There is reason to believe that the OPEC countries would refuse to
submit to the extensive discovery that would be required to deal with the
factual antitrust issues. Their refusal to submit to discovery might, how-
ever, be turned against them. Section 1608(e) of the FSIA requires that
the claim for relief be established. But the House Report makes it clear
that "[iln determining whether the claimant has established his claim or
right to relief, it is expected that courts will take into account the extent
to which the plaintiff's case depends on appropriate discovery against the
Vol. 12:215
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foreign state."'" That the intent is to lighten plaintiff's factual burden
when defendants refuse discovery is made clear by reference3 2 to Rule 37
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides sanctions as harsh
as establishment of facts against the party refusing discovery33 and even
default.3 4 The discovery would have to be "appropriate" and steer clear of
"sensitive governmental documents,"35 but it is doubtful that a court
could rule out discovery relating to a conspiracy with the oil companies.
Thus if a prima facie showing can be made with evidence otherwise
available, the plaintiff might prevail under section 1608(e) if defendants
refuse to submit to discovery, and facts which discovery might plausibly
turn up would complete plaintiff's proof of an issue. It is hard to believe
that serious factual research could not establish a prima facie case on the
proximate effect at the gas pump issue. It is not unlikely that it could be
established on the Illinois Brick conspiracy issue as well.
The doctrinal antitrust proposition that plaintiffs must establish is
that foreign states can be antitrust defendants. This issue can be won. As
a matter of antitrust law, the OPEC members should be suable. This is
not to say that it should be possible to sue foreign states for antitrust
violations in all cases. In the end it should not be possible to sue the
OPEC states for price fixing. (See part IV infra). But this is so not by
virtue of antitrust law but but by virtue of the FSIA.
The argument that the definitions in the antitrust laws exclude for-
eign state defendants because they are neither "corporations" nor "as-
sociations" can no longer be made after Pfizer. The definition of "person"
in Clayton Act section 1 defines the term for both plaintiffs and defen-
dants. The Pfizer Court found that definition compatible with a foreign
state's being a person. Therefore that definition cannot foreclose the pos-
sibility that foreign states can be antitrust defendants.
The more persuasive argument that foreign states cannot be antitrust
defendants looks to the language of Pfizer to the effect that permitting
foreign states to be antitrust plaintiffs does not "require the judiciary in
any way to interfere in sensitive matters of foreign policy."3 8 Judge Hauk
quoted this language, then continued, "[t]o include foreign nations within
the ambit of "persons" who may be sued as defendants, however, would
require judicial interference in sensitive foreign policy matters. 3 7 And in
31 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1976), [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6604, 6625.
:2 Id. at 6621, 6625 n. 3.
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
1, Id. at 37(b)(2)(B).
35 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 31, at [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6621.
" 434 U.S. at 319.
37 IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 572.
1980
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a footnote:
Giving a foreign sovereign the option to sue, merely allows the nation to
use our judicial system if it wishes. Allowing foreign sovereigns to be
sued, however, would require their presence in our courts. Thus the lat-
ter poses the greater threat to sensitive matters of foreign policy. 8
This consideration is obviously of the first level of importance. Just as
obviously it is a matter that goes right to the heart of the rationale of the
FSIA. The "sensitive matters of foreign policy" involved in requiring the
presence of foreign sovereigns in our courts are precisely the motivation
behind sovereign immunity. But the FSIA purports to set "the sole and
exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immu-
nity." Those standards, embodying the restrictive theory'of sovereign
immunity, distinguish between commercial and governmental activity. To
interpret the antitrust laws to exclude foreign state defendants engaged
in commercial activity on the basis of "sensitive matters of foreign policy"
would be to defy Congress' clear mandate in the FSIA.
Finally a quick look should be taken at the precedents under which
Judge Hauk felt himself to be bound to find that foreign states cannot be
antitrust defendants. It may be noted first that Judge Hauk had a very
broad notion of stare decisis to think that a federal district court in Cali-
fornia could be bound by the decision of a federal district court in Dela-
ware. Under more traditional notions a court is bound only by its own
past decisions and the decisions of courts to which its judgments may be
appealed. Moreover, in none of the cases cited by Judge Hauk was a for-
eign state a defendant. Therefore technically none of those cases held
that a foreign state cannot be an antitrust defendant. A court is not
bound by dicta.
Thus the question whether a foreign state can be an antitrust defen-
dant is not settled either by the language of the antitrust acts or by the
case law. Under the terms of the FSIA the foreign policy implications of
this question are to be considered not under the antitrust laws guided by
judicial intuitions about foreign policy, but under the guidelines set out
by the FSIA. Therefore the second of Judge Hauk's three alternative
grounds for dimissal of the suit against the OPEC members reduces to
the first-turning on jurisdiction under the FSIA.
C. The Sovereign Immunity Issues
1. Affirmative Defense and Default.
Judge Hauk agreed that the FSIA makes sovereign immunity a mat-
38 Id. at n.18.
3' H.R. Rm. No. 1487, supra note 31, at [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6610.
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ter of subject matter jurisdiction, which can, therefore, be raised sua
sponte. However, there is an argument, drawing on the legislative history,
that sovereign immunity must be affirmatively asserted if it is to be used
as a defense against default.
[S]ince sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which must be spe-
cially pleaded, the burden will remain on the foreign state to produce
evidence in support of its claim of immunity. Thus, evidence must be
produced to establish that a foreign state or one of its subdivisions, agen-
cies or instrumentalities is the defendant in the suit and that the plain-
tiff's claim relates to a public act of the foreign state-that is, an act not
within the exceptions in sections 1605-1607. Once the foreign state has
produced such prima facie evidence of immunity, the burden of going
forward would shift to the plaintiff to produce evidence establishing that
the foreign state is not entitled to immunity. The ultimate burden of
proving immunity wuld rest with the foreign state.40
This language by itself would strongly suggest that a defendant who
failed to make an appearance could not be saved from default by sover-
eign immunity. The burdens of pleading, going forward, and persuasion
all rest on the defendant. Arguably, the defendant, in failing to appear,
must fail to carry all three burdens.
This line of argument, however, is in apparent conflict with FSIA
section 1608(e).
No judgment by default shall be entered by a Court of the United States
or of a State against a foreign state ... unless the claimant establishes
his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.41
If there is a conflict between the legislative history and the statutory lan-
guage, the latter, of course, governs. Presumably, however, the two can be
harmonized. There are three main possibilities:
(1) § 1608(e) requires the plaintiff to prove only those issues on which
the plaintiff bears the burdens of going forward and persuasion. The
plaintiff may win other issues by default.
(2) When the defendant makes no appearance, the court may raise
the issue of sovereign immunity sua sponte. The burden of going for-
ward is met if the evidence before the court (by whomever produced)
constitutes a prima facie case. Similarly, the burden of persuasion is
met if that evidence meets the preponderance standard. The judge is
permitted to require the production of the necessary evidence.
(3) The language from the House Report has relevance only where
the defendant makes an appearance. Otherwise the burdens of going
forward and of persuasion on the sovereign immunity issue rest with
the plaintiff.
40 Id. at 6616.
4 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1976).
1980
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A plaintiff might put forth alternative (1). It fits well with the pas-
sage quoted from the House Report. However, it fits very poorly with the
underlying purposes of the FSIA. It is precisely in those cases that are
most offensive to the sovereignty of the foreign state that it is unlikely to
"dignify the proceedings" with an appearance. It would turn the FSIA on
its head to interpret the Act as requiring that the foreign state lose its
immunity under such circumstances.
However, interpretation (3) permits the foreign state to shift burdens
to the plaintiff by the simple expedient of making no appearance. Since a
purpose of the Act was to bring defendants, not protected by sovereign
immunity as restrictively understood, into United States courts, Congress
presumably had no intention of making it easier for the foreign state to
prevail on sovereign immunity by nonappearance than by appearance.
This leaves interpretation (2) as the most plausible way of harmoniz-
ing the legislative history with section 1608(e). It is true that (2) is, on
first blush, a little awkward in requiring the neutral court to take a fairly
active role as "substitute" for the defendent. But reflection suggests that
this is an inevitable consequence of the basic idea of section 1608(e),
under which the court must reach the merits of the case without the par-
ticipation of the defendant.
Judge Hauk's treatment of the sovereign immunity issues arguably
comports with interpretation (2). The court implicitly found that the
facts available met the defendants' burdens of going forward and of
persuasion.
It appears, then, that no quick victory for plaintiffs can be antici-
pated through the use of an "affirmative defense-default" argument on
sovereign immunity. However, keeping interpretation (2) and its distribu-
tion of burdens in mind might be of use to plaintiffs who seek to litigate
the issue of commercial activity.
2. Commercial activity.
The key to winning an antitrust suit against the members of OPEC
would be to establish that their activity in setting oil prices is commercial
in nature. There are plausible arguments to this effect, starting with the
observation that setting the price at which a commodity will be sold on
the world market, largely to private buyers, is surely a prima facie com-
mercial activity.
Moreover there is explicit language in the legislative history that re-
inforces this conclusion.
A "regular course of commercial conduct" includes the carrying on of a
commercial enterprise such as a mineral extraction company, an airline
Vol. 12:215
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or a state trading corporation. Certainly, if an activity is customarily car-
ried on for profit, its commercial nature could readily be assumed. At the
other end of the spectrum, a single contract, if of the same character as a
contract which might be made by a private person, could constitute a
"particular transaction or act."'42
Since the OPEC members are typically at least part owners of the
wells and distribution facilities, "agencies" or "instrumentalities" of the
foreign states are "mineral extraction companies." If this explicit inclu-
sion within the commercial category were not enough, it is probably safe
to conclude that the production and sale of oil is an activity "customarily
carried on for profit."
The court took note of the "mineral extraction companies" language
in the legislative history, but relied on a theory that the essential nature
of the OPEC states' activity is not the fixing of prices of sale by mineral
extractive companies, but rather the regulation of the crude oil resource.
Indeed the price fixing itself is only made possible by the policy of the
restriction of the supply of oil.43
What this comes down to is an argument that, since the underlying
purpose of the price fixing-the husbanding of resources-is non-com-
mercial in motivation, the price fixing itself should not fall within the
commercial exception to sovereign immunity.
It is worth examining Judge Hauk's contention that the underlying
activity is, in fact, non-commercial. Certainly the restriction of supply to
achieve a monopoly profit is an ordinary commercial technique that
seems clearly to fit within the language of the House Report. Is the regu-
lation of resources anything more than maximizing the long run profit to
be derived from the resource? Perhaps the willingness of OPEC members
to use oil embargoes for military and political purposes shows that there
is more going on here than long term profit maximization, but it would be
interesting to see if it could be demonstrated that the general policies
underlying the participation of each state in OPEC lead to behavior sig-
nificantly different from what would be expected from a private owner of
the same resource.
However, even if it is granted that the "underlying" purpose behind
OPEC price fixing is a non-commercial one, Judge Hauk's argument still
has difficulties. The legislative history distinguishes between the purpose
of an activity and the activity itself, as indicated in the House Report's
discussion of contracts.
[T]he fact that goods or services to be procured through a contract are to
be used for a public purpose is irrelevant; it is the essentially commercial
:2 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 31, at [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6614-15.
IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 567.
1980
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
nature of an activity or transaction that is critical. Thus, a contract by a
foreign government to buy provisions or equipment for its armed forces
or to construct a government building constitutes a commercial activi-
ty. . . . Such contracts should be considered to be commercial contracts,
even if their ultimate object is to further a public function. 4
The paradigmatic sovereign activity is the maintenance of armed
forces. If the making of contracts for the purpose of maintaining armed
forces is commercial, so, it can be argued, is the fixing of prices of sale on
the market for the purpose of regulating resources. Therefore Judge
Hauk's demonstration that international law recognizes control over re-
sources as a sovereign activity" is largely beside the point. Commercial
activities stemming from sovereign purplde ar nonetheless commercial.
The preferred strategy for winning this point in court would proba-
bly not be to make it in logical abstraction, but rather to embed it in a
factual demonstration of the commercial nature of OPEC activities. This
would largely overlap with the factual showing necessary under the anti-
trust issues. In particular there is a requirement included in the key third
clause of the commercial exception that there be a direct effect on the
United States. Commercial activity without direct effect is not suffi-
cient.46 Presumably this proof would parallel that required to justify the
use of an injunction. 47
Discovery against the OPEC members would focus on their agree-
ments, contracts, and proprietary interests. If this discovery were refused,
the sanctions of section 1608(e)48 could, again, be turned to good effect by
the plaintiff. In any event, a heavily factual approach, with significant
discovery requests, would make it more difficult for the court to conclude
that absent defendants have satisfied their burden of persuasion 9 on the
sovereign immunity issue.
3. Waiver of Immunity in Treaties.
FSIA section 1604 contains an exception to immunity if a waiver was
incorporated in a treaty.
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States
is a party at the time of the enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be
immune ....
A district court has found that immunity to prejudgment attachment
4 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 31, at [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 6615.
45 IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 567.
41 Carey v. Nat'l Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1978).
47 See text preceding note 31 supra.
48 See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text.
41 See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
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under section 1608 was waived by the Iran-United States Amity Treaty."
The opposite conclusion, however, was reached by a second district
court. 1 There does not seem to be language in any other amity treaties
with OPEC states in effect in 1976 that constitutes a plausible waiver of
section 1604.immunity.
IV. THE CASE WAS RIGHTLY DECIDED
As emerges from the above discussion, the court's arguments in the
OPEC case are flawed on a number of points. A concentration on the
details of the legislative history of the FSIA suggests that OPEC's price
fixing is a commercial activity and, therefore, that sovereign immunity
should not be available.
However, that should not, in fact, have been the outcome of the case.
However clumsily Judge Hauk may have handled some of the details, his
instincts were correct. The suit against OPEC is just the sort of case for
which Congress must have intended there to be sovereign immunity. To
see why this is so it is only necessary to consider what would have hap-
pened if the IAM had won the suit. The court would then have issued an
injunction to Libya, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and the ten other states
forbidding them from conspiring to fix prices. It is conceivable that this
injunction could be enforced if the United States were willing to make
full use of its military power, and assuming that nuclear war did not in-
tervene to make the whole matter academic. In short, to say that a suit
against the members of OPEC for price fixing intrudes into a sensitive
foreign policy area is a masterpiece of understatement.
The FSIA was intended to codify a restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, but not a theory which had severed all relation to the purpose
behind sovereign immunity in the first place. That underlying purpose is
to insure that clashes of major policies between different nations take
place in the diplomatic arena rather than the courts of one or another
country.
Unfortunately the commercial-governmental distinction in the FSIA
and its legislative history is not an ideal instrument for accomplishing
this purpose. It fails to take into account the importance of the activity to
the national economy and the extent to which the foreign nation identi-
fies the activity with its national policy. Price fixing of a commodity on
the world market is, from the standpoint of common sense and the ex-
plicit language of the legislative history, a commercial activity. But for
the purposes of the FSIA it must be held to be "non-commercial" in this
"0 Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383, 390 (C.D.N.J.
1979).
" Reading & Bates Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., No. 478 F. Supp. 724, 728 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
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case. It must be so held because the cartelization of oil is a central ele-
ment of both the foreign and economic policies of the members of OPEC.
It is worth noting as well that antitrust suits are in general dubious
under the theory lying behind the notion of sovereign immunity. Anti-
trust laws represent national ideological perspectives on the proper organ-
ization of an economy. Ideological conflict of this sort is typically a sensi-
tive matter of policy. When a state itself is a defendant, it is to be
expected that the policy considerations will be dominant.
These considerations must be read into the FSIA's definitions to re-
strict the area of "commercial activity" or the Act will not fulfill the func-
tion that sovereign immunity is called upon to perform in preventing un-
necessary conflicts within the community of nations.
